Those who because of a mistake fail to accomplish what they have in mind to do are the agents of unintentional acts, and those who do or experience anything unintentional are responsible for their sufferings. By his unintentional mistake against himself he experienced his own misfortune, but he has punished himself for his mistake and thus has his just deserts.
It's not something we want or enjoy, for we share his pain and his suffering. Since the mistake is his, the act is not ours but results from his mistake; and since the suffering afflicts the doer, we are relieved of blame, and the doer is punished at the very moment of his mistake. On the surface this "law" seems contradictory how can a law prohibit "just killing"?
This young man will suffer unholy evils if he has to pay for mistakes that are not his, while I, who am just as innocent as he is but not more, will encounter much greater misfortune. If he is ruined, the rest of my life will be unlivable, and my childlessness will be a tomb while I still live, [n] So, take pity on this young man, whose misfortune is not his fault, and on me, this wretched old man, whose suffering was so unexpected. Do not vote for conviction and consign us to a miserable fate, but respect the gods and acquit us.
The victim is not unavenged for the misfortune he fell into, 11 and it is not right for us to bear a share of his errors. In the past he wasn't the least bit disrespectful or daring, but now he is compelled by misfortune itself to make statements I never imagined he would utter. Here the pairing does little but foreshadow later, more significant instances 3.
However, the plaintiffs second speech is substantially longer than either of the defendant's speeches. By contrast, I have done nothing wrong but have suffered terrible miseries and now suffer even more terribly. So, gentlemen—you who punish evil deeds and distinguish righteous actions—I seek refuge in your pity in fact, not in word, and I make this request: where the facts are clear, don't let yourselves be persuaded by a wicked subtlety of words to think that the truth of what was done is really false.
IS  For subtlety is persuasive rather than true, while truth is less deceitful but also less powerful.
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If I put my trust in justice, I can ignore the defendant's arguments, but I distrust the cruel hand of divinity and dread the possibility not only of losing the benefit of my son but also of seeing him condemned by you as a murderer. I think I could make a more convincing case for intentional homicide than this man can when he asserts that the young man neither threw nor killed.
But the young man made a mistake about the right moment for picking up the javelins. He wasn't prevented from hitting his target; no, he hit a most wretched and bitter target. He didn't kill intentionally, but it would be more accurate to say he killed intentionally than to say he did not throw or kill at all. But who threw the javelin? Who is to be credited with the killing? The spectators or the attendants, whom no one accuses of anything? There is nothing obscure about his death; for me it is all too clear.
I say the law is correct to prescribe punishment for those who kill, since its right that someone who kills when he did not intend to kill have troubles he did not intend to have, but it would be wrong for the victim to be left unavenged, since he suffers just as much from unintentional as from intentional harm. If misfortune is not caused by divine involvement, then it's right for the person who erred to suffer the consequences of his mistake; but if a divine pollution falls on the agent for some impious act, it would not be right to prevent divine retribution.
But how could we deserve our suffering, when we have led just as good a life and are punished with death? When he claims he made no mistake and argues that those who make mistakes deserve misfortune but not those who make no mistake, he is arguing our case. For my son made no mistake affecting anyone but was killed by this young man; it would be wrong if he is not avenged.
And I too will suffer dreadfully, though I'm even less guilty of error than he, if you don't give me the revenge granted by the law. If it's right to consider the boy his own killer because he ran into the path of the javelin and didn't stand still, then the young man is not free from blame either, but only if he was standing still and not throwing his javelin when the boy died.
But since both contributed to the killing, and the boy has already punished himself more severely than warranted by a mistake that affected only himself—for he's dead—then surely it's not right that his accomplice and partner in a mistake affecting those who didn't deserve it at all should escape without penalty. We have already been destroyed by their mistake; if you now convict us of murder, you would make us suffer not righteously but unrighteously.
And if those who have brought us this death are not banned from the appropriate places,17 your acquittal of those who are unholy would be disrespectful of the gods. If you convict him and ban him from the places restricted by law, you will remain innocent of the charges, but if you acquit him, you are guilty. Don't share in this person's pollution yourselves; and for us the parents, already living in this tomb because of him, make this disaster at least seem lighter.
The defendant here agrees that the actions occurred as we have stated, but he disagrees on the question of the killer, although it is impossible to show who the killer is in any other way than from the actions. I'm not saying the boy threw a javelin or hit himself with it but that by going under the javelin's blow he was killed not by the young man but by himself; for he did not die standing still.
And since this running is to blame, then if he ran out because he was called by the trainer, the trainer would be the one who killed him, but if he ran out on his own impulse, then he was killed by himself. The young man did not miss his target any more than any of his fellow practicers, nor did he do anything he is accused of through his own mistake; but the boy didn't act in the same way as his fellow spectators but ran out into the path of the javelin.
This shows clearly that because of his own error he met with greater misfortunes than those who stood still. The thrower would not have missed his target if no one had run under his javelin; and the boy would not have been hit if he had stayed with the spectators.
If the boy died because the young man threw his javelin, then all his fellow practicers would share responsibility for the act, since the reason they didn't hit him is not because they didn't throw their javelins but because he did not run under any of their javelins. The young man did not make a mistake any more than they did; just like them he would not have hit the boy if he had stood still with the other spectators. The young man saw no one running across the field, so how could he have taken care not to hit anyone?
But the boy saw the javelin-throwers and could easily have taken care that no one hit him, for he could have stood still. Since the young man made no mistake, it would not be fair for him to be punished for someone else's mistake; it is enough for him to bear the consequences of his own mistakes. But the boy was destroyed by his own mistake, and the moment he erred, he also punished himself.
Therefore, the killer is punished and the death is not unavenged. Since the boy himself bears the consequences of his own mistake, he will not leave behind an avenging spirit; but the young man is innocent of all 3. So, don't cast us into troubles we don't deserve, and don't lend assistance to them in their misfortunes by rendering a verdict contrary to the divinity.
Rather, in accordance with divine and human justice, remember that this unfortunate event occurred because of his running under the path of the javelin, and acquit us. We are not to blame for the killing. The case concerns a death resulting from a fight when both men had apparently been drinking, circumstances that were probably as common in Athens as they are today.
As in the Second Tetralogy, questions are raised about the two mens intentions and the victim's own responsibility for his death. A third possible agent is also introduced, the doctor who attended the victim before his death, though under Athenian law a doctor could not normally be held responsible for the death of his patient. Although some cases of killing in self-defense, such as killing an attacker on the highway, could be categorized as "lawful homicide" and tried at the Delphinium see Dem. If the victim started the fight and the plaintiff in this case never explicitly denies this , this could bolster the defense against a charge of intentional homicide but did not automatically make the killing lawful.
T he defendant certainly seems to have the weaker case, and Antiphon probably intends to underline this weakness by having him leave for exile before his second speech, which is delivered by friends. Although the jurors still could decide for the defendant, his departure undoubtedly conveyed the strong impression of lack of confidence and thus probably made a conviction more likely.
I  It is a well-established rule that prosecutors in homicide cases should make every effort to make their case and present their witnesses in accordance with justice and not let the guilty go free or bring the innocent to trial. Finally, we also assume responsibility for your error if we persuade you to do something unlawful. For your part, these considerations mean that you must give your verdict the full attention it deserves and assign the criminal a penalty appropriate to the suffering he has caused; in this way you will keep the entire city free of pollution.
And 2 There is no standard Greek myth of human creation, but the sophists took great interest in the creation and early history of humans. Aeschylus, Prometheus — , Euripides, Suppliants — , and Dcmocritus may have devised an account of early human society.
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Antiphon here also alludes to a common sophistic theme in suggesting thatphysis, or human nature, provides a foundation for nomos, or law; see further Kerferd in — You have heard the witnesses who were with him when he was drunk. You must stem the lawlessness of this injury, punish his arrogance for the suffering he caused, and take away his life as he took away another's by this deed he planned.
But it's only natural I think that I'm upset at them for wanting to put this case on the level of the most serious crimes, since the victim was actually more responsible for his own death than I was. He began the fight by drunkenly attacking someone much more sober, and so he is responsible not just for his own misfortune but also for this charge against me. He hit me first, and even if I had defended myself with a sword or a rock or a stick, I still wouldn't be wrong, since those who start a fight should rightly be repaid not in the same degree but more severely.
He hit me with his hands, and I returned the blows with my own hands. Was that wrong? If the man had died from the blows on the spot, then his death would be attributable to me, though it would still be just, for justice requires that those who start a fight be repaid not in the same degree but more severely. But you his advisers caused his death, which has led to 'For this "law," sec 3. But how could I have plotted to kill him unless he plotted to kill me too?
I used the same means in defending myself against him; I did the same to him as he did to me, and clearly he plotted the same against me as I plotted against him. So, since I am acquitted by the law and by the fact that he started the fight, I am not in any way his killer. The victim is the killer, and if it was unfortunate that he died, he was the victim of his own misfortune, since he had the misfortune to start the fight.
But if he died through thoughtlessness, then it was his own thoughtlessness, for he wasn't thinking well when he struck me. By plotting to murder me, though I am innocent of all blame, and depriving me of the life god gave me, they sin against god; by plotting my death unjustly, they violate all human laws and become in fact my murderers; and by persuading you to put me to death in this unholy fashion, they also become murderers of your righteousness.
You [jurors], however, must consider your own interest and be willing to acquit, not convict me. If I am wrongly acquitted and get off because you were incorrectly informed, then I will set the dead man's spirit of vengeance on the person who did not inform you, not on you; but if I am wrongly convicted by you, I will inflict the wrath of his avenging spirits on you, not on him.
Although the defendant in this case is accused of killing the victim himself, not by planning, the prosecutors allusion to planning 4. In this way all our citizens would remain completely pure. He agrees he struck the blows that led to the death, but he says he's not the victim's murderer; instead, though he lives and breathes, he accuses us of being his murderer, though we seek only revenge.
I want to show that the rest of his defense has arguments similar to these. But first of all, you know that young men are more likely 1eikos to get drunk and start a fight than old men; for they are proud of their birth, at their peak physically, and not used to drinking, all of which arouses them to anger. Old men, however, tend to control themselves, since they are used to drinking, are weak in old age, and fear the strength of the young. And if he killed with his hands and not with a sword, he is all the more the killer, since his hands are more part of him than a sword.
But I say the opposite. If our hands are servants of our intentions, then the one who hit but didn't kill only planned the blow, but the one who struck the fatal blow planned the death; for the man is dead as a result of his intentional act. The one who struck the blow has met with misfortune; the one who was hit has met with disaster. And even if he did die in the doctor's hands which he didn't , the doctor is not his killer, for the law protects him. For our part, we have demonstrated clearly how he died, there is agreement about the blow that caused his death, and the law assigns the murder to the one who struck the blow.
So, we implore you to act on behalf of the dead man and appease the wrath of the avenging spirits with this man's death, thus making the city free of his pollution. As his friends, we think it more righteous to defend him while still alive than when he's dead. It would be best, of course, if he could give his own defense, but he thought it would be safer, so it is left to us to defend him, since we would be most grieved by losing him.
The prosecutor uses improbable arguments in claiming this man started it. If it were a law of nature that just as we see with our eyes and hear with our ears, so too the young are aggressive and the old act with restraint, then we would not need 'See 4. Antiphon may mean the defendant's departure here to suggest the weakness of his case.
But many young men act with restraint, and many of the elderly become violent when drunk, so this argument does not support the prosecutor any more than the defendant. For if the striker, by striking a blow and forcing you to seek the care of a doctor, is the murderer rather than the one who killed him,9 then the initiator of the fight is in fact the murderer; for he compelled the other to strike back in selfdefense and the one who was then struck to go to the doctor.
It would be an awful experience for the defendant if he is declared the murderer instead of the actual killer, though he did not kill, and the initiator of the fight instead of the actual initiator, though he did not start it. For if the initiator of the fight had intended to strike but not kill and the defender had intended to kill, then the latter would be the plotter, but he too intended to strike, not kill; he just made a mistake, and his blow had unintended results.
And the mistake belongs in fact to the initiator rather than the one who hit back, who was only seeking to return the blow he suffered when he was forced into a mistake by his assailant. But everything this one did or suffered resulted from his own lack of self-control; so he is responsible for his own and the other man's mistake and can justly be declared the murderer. The other man acted entirely out of drunken arrogance, with no thought of self-defense, but the defendant only wanted to avoid suffering and ward off the blows; what he suffered was involuntary, and in trying to avoid suffering he did less than the initiator of the fight deserved.
It was self-defense, not aggression. The argument envisages a chain of causation: if we move responsibility from the immediate cause of death the doctor to an earlier cause the striker , then we should also move it back to an even earlier cause the starter of the fight. The misfortune thus belongs to the initiator of the fight, not the defender. The latter acted and suffered unintentionally and became involved in someone else's misfortune, but the initiator did everything intentionally: he brought this fortune on himself by his own actions, and by his own misfortune he erred.
But if someone thinks the deed and the misfortune belong to both parties jointly and decides on the basis of the arguments presented that the defendant is equally deserving of acquittal and conviction, even in that case it's right to acquit rather than convict him. For it's unjust for someone to gain a conviction without showing clearly that he has been wronged, and it's wrong to convict a defendant unless the charge has been clearly proven.
If you do, the dead man's spirit will still be just as much an avenging spirit for those guilty of the crime, and the unholy destruction of this man will double the pollution brought by those spirits against those who killed him. As for the polluted killer, leave him to be revealed by time and punished by the victim's relatives. In this way you would do what is best for men and gods. The speaker disregards the fact that the defendant is already in exile and thus would not be put to death or leave avenging spirits cf.
Moreover, the person guilty of the original homicide according to the defense, namely, the victim himself, has already been punished in full. Modern opinion generally agrees, though our ignorance on several important issues makes any assessment of the argument difficult. Being a defense speech, it can be selective in its narration of events, for the jurors would already have been given an account by the prosecution.
The mixture of substantive and procedural issues also complicates our assessment. The speech was delivered about a decade after the Mytilenean revolt in BC. As reported by Thucydides 3. Athens put down the revolt, executed its leaders, and sent Athenian settlers, who divided up the territory. The Mytileneans continued to farm the land, paying an annual rent. It is a reasonable guess that Merodes was one of these Athenian settlers. The speaker is a young Mytilenean, whose name, according to a late source, is Euxitheus.
His father had played some part in this revolt 5. We may imagine that the Athenian jurors would still have strong memories of the event and might be biased against any Mytilenean, though it is impossible to know how this would have affected their verdict. The events, as best we can reconstruct them, are as follows: Euxitheus was traveling on the same boat as Herodes from Mytilene to Thrace, when they were forced by a storm to put in at a small harbor on the north shore of Lesbos.
There they waited out the storm, drinking on another boat in the harbor, one that had a roof. A search was made, but no body was ever found. Euxitheus then continued to Thrace, but when he later returned to Mytilene, he was accused of murdering Merodes. In his absence Merodes' relatives had apparently interrogated a slave who initially denied any knowledge of the crime but later, under torture, confessed to assisting Euxitheus in the murder. His story was that they had killed Merodes on shore, striking him with a rock, and had dumped his body at sea from a small boat.
The prosecution also presented an incriminating note, allegedly written by Euxitheus to a certain Lycinus. Both men had previously had dealings with Merodes. It is not clear what specific motive, if any, the prosecution gave for the crime. Euxitheus was then brought to Athens for trial. In his defense, Euxitheus first argues vehemently against the procedure used to prosecute him see below. He then disputes the facts, claiming the events that night happened by chance and could not have been planned and pointing to several contradictions in the prosecution's case.
Euxitheus also emphasizes that the slave's story was extracted from him by torture when Euxitheus was absent, and the prosecution then put the slave to death, their purpose being he says to prevent Euxitheus from questioning him and exposing the truth. Another witness, a free man, had given different testimony, stating that Euxitheus never left the boat that night. Euxitheus also accuses the prosecution of planting the note to Lycinus and claims, moreover, that neither he nor Lycinus had any motive for killing Herodes.
He concludes that the prosecution do not know who killed Herodes, and he accuses them rather vaguely of manufacturing the case against him for their own profit. The procedural issue is thorny. Once the Basileus accepted the case, the accused was banned from most sacred and public places until the trial 3. Other special rules applied to homicide cases concerning such matters as oaths, and the accused could voluntarily go into exile any time before his second speech 4.
It could also be used against a killer caught in a place from which he was banned, but according to Euxitheus, it had never before been used for an ordinary case of homicide. He is being tried in one of the popular courts where most trials took place before a large jury of ordinary citizens, rather than before the Areopagus.
The reason for this irregular procedure may have been to ensure that he did not leave Athens before the trial. Since his father was living in Thrace, voluntary exile from Athens and probably from Mytilene too would probably not be much of a hardship for him. But the prosecution may have had other motives as well. The prologue 1 — 7 is followed by arguments about the proper procedure for prosecution The epilogue 85—96 is devoted largely to the procedural issue discussed in The verdict is unknown. For further discussion of the issues in this case, see the notes to Edwards' translation in M.
Edwards and S. Usher, eds. It is not clear how much authority they had. The Basileus in Antiphon 6 initially rejected a homicide case on technical grounds, and in Lysias 13 the Eleven forced the prosecutor to modify the wording of his indictment. Thus, someone with little experience in legal contests is forced to address himself to the prosecutions words rather than the actual events and the truth of what happened.
It is not right for someone who goes wrong in his actions to be saved by words or for one who has been correct in his actions to be ruined by words. A word is only a mistake 2 For the topos of inexperience, cf. In comparing the remarks on truth here 5. So, my request, gentlemen, is both legally and morally right—in accordance with your justice no less than my own. I shall now answer each of the charges in turn. Its not that I would avoid trial by you, the people: s even if you were not under oath or subject to any law, I would entrust my life to your verdict, since I am confident I have done no wrong in this matter and that your decision will be guided by justice.
But I want you to treat this violent and illegal behavior as evidence of their treatment of me and their conduct in general. The prosecution themselves bear witness that I am not a common criminal and am not subject to the law concerning them. That law concerns thieves and cloak-snatchers, and they have not shown that these are relevant to my case. I agree, its the greatest.
But so are temple robbery and treason, and yet there are separate laws for each of these. In my case the prosecution have in the first place caused the trial to be held in the Agora,8 the very place that is proclaimed off-limits for oth' I. For kakourgos, see 2. K The popular courts were located in the Athenian Agora; the Areopagus met on a hill nearby. This case was probably tried in a roofed building called the Parabyston, where the Eleven presided; see Boegehold esp.
They did this not for my benefit but for their own profit, thereby giving the dead man less than the law provides. You will learn their reasons for this in the course of my speech. You have evaded this law and done the opposite from others. Also, you ought to have sworn the greatest and strongest oath,11 calling down destruction on yourself, your family, and your entire household and swearing to confine your case to this murder alone. And then you ask the jurors to convict me of homicide on the evidence of unsworn witnesses, though you have proven them untrustworthy by your own violations of the established laws.
The best-known example is the trial of Socrates, where after the guilty verdict the prosecutors proposed the death penalty, and Socrates countered by proposing a modest fine see Plato s reconstruction in the Apology. The penalty in a dike phonou was death, with exile as a practical alternative. Also in a homicide case, witnesses swore their support for the litigant s guilt or innocence, but in other cases witnesses were probably unsworn. They are the oldest established laws in this land, and their main points have always remained the same, ls which is the best sign of well-enacted laws; for time and experience teach people the faults in things.
Therefore, you should not learn from the prosecutors words whether the laws are good or not, but rather let the laws instruct you whether or not the prosecutors words give an accurate account of the situation. Only you have had the audacity to become a legislator and make them worse, seeking to ruin me unjustly in violation of these laws. Your violations are themselves the greatest evidence in my favor, for you are well aware that you would not have anyone testifying against me if they had had to swear the homicide oath.
As a result, even an acquittal will do me no good, since you can say that I was acquitted of being a common criminal but not on the charge of homicide; on the other hand, if you win, you'll demand the death penalty on the ground that I was convicted of homicide. Could there be a more! The sentiments in 5. If you persuade these men once, you'll have what you want, but if I am acquitted once, I'll still face the same danger!
I was willing to post three sureties,16 as the law allows, but they would not let me do so.
No other foreigner who was willing to post sureties has ever been imprisoned; and the officials in charge of cases of common criminals abide by this same law. So once more this law that applies to all other men fails to benefit me alone. They have also disgraced me and my family for the rest of our lives. Even so, I'll try to demonstrate my innocence, though it is indeed hard to refute on the spot lies that have been carefully plotted for a long time now; one cannot take precautions against the unexpected.
We were sailing to Aenus,1V I to visit my father—for he happened to be there at the time—and Herodes to ransom prisoners to some Thracians. Also on the same boat were the prisoners who were to be ransomed and the Thracians who were going to pay the ransom. I present witnesses to these facts. U A standard way of guaranteeing any promise, such as a debt, was to have friends commonly three stand surety; so Socrates' friends offer surety for his proposed fine in Plato's Apology see above, 5. We know of no other case where someone refuses to accept sureties, but the prosecutor's refusal, though unusual, was probably not illegal.
It was about nautical miles from Mytilene; the journey would take about three days in normal conditions. From Mytilene one would sail north along the east coast of Lesbos and then west perhaps as far as Methymna, then directly north to Asia Minor, and then north along the coast to Aenus—never out of sight of land. It is likely that the boat left Mytilene early in the morning, encountered a storm in the early evening, and made it to shore before nightfall. We happened to encounter a storm, which forced us to put in to shore at a spot in the territory of Methymna.
But first consider this: these events took place by chance, not prearrangement, for no one has shown that I persuaded the man to sail with me. No, he made the journey on his own, for his own private business;  and I too clearly had sufficient reason of my own to make the journey to Aenus. Putting in to shore was also unplanned and resulted from necessity. Then, after we anchored, there was no contrivance or deceit in the transfer to the other boat, but this too was necessary because of the rain, for the boat we were sailing in did not have a covered deck, but the one we transferred to did.
Its clear that Merodes left the boat and did not return again, but I did not leave the boat at all that night. The next day the man was missing, and I helped in the search no less than the others; for this was as much a concern to me as to anyone. And I was responsible for a messenger being sent to Mytilene; for on my advice we decided to send him.
When the man could not be found in Mytilene or anywhere else and good sailing weather had returned and all the other boats were putting out to sea, I too sailed off. I present you with the witnesses to these facts. At that moment truth and the facts were more powerful than their accusation, and also I was still there.
But when I sailed away and these men conspired and contrived their plot against me, then they made their accusation. And they have precise information about this, but they cannot give any plausible account of the man's disappearance. Clearly this probably happened near the harbor; the man was drunk and left the boat at night, so he probably could not control his actions, and someone wishing to lead him far away at night would not have had a plausible excuse to do so.
So should I accept their account, even though I have witnesses that I did not leave the boat? Even if I definitely left the boat, there's no reasonable explanation how the man could disappear and not be found unless he went a long way from the sea. In what boat? Clearly the boat must have come from the harbor; why wouldn't they find it? There would probably be some evidence in the boat, if a dead man was thrown overboard at night. In fact, they said they found evidence in the boat where he was drinking and then left—where they agree he did not die; but they have not found the boat from which he was thrown into the sea or any sign of it.
The first thing they did was go on board and search the boat, and when they found the blood, they said the man had been killed there. But when this possibility was eliminated and they discovered that it was the blood of sheep,-0 they abansomc narrative is embedded in the following argument and some argument in the preceding narrative.
Now, consider carefully the nature of this interrogation. If I ordered him put on the rack for not telling the truth, this alone would probably make him recant his false accusations. As it was, the interrogators calculated their own self-interest. Of the two mentioned in 5. The free man was probably a Mytilenean of low standing 5. But although strict rules applied to an interrogation that resulted from a challenge by one litigant to the other 1. Nonetheless, Euxitheus 1 complaints may raise doubts about the prosecution's motives. Now they base their case against me on this informer, though everyone else treats informers in just the opposite way, rewarding free men with money and slaves with their freedom.
But they rewarded this informer with death, despite the entreaties of my friends that they should not kill the man before I returned. If the man were alive and I carried out the same interrogation, he would provide evidence of their plotting, but now that he's dead, his absence makes it impossible to prove the truth, while his false words live on as the truth and destroy me.
Call witnesses to these facts. But tell me, which of his stories are they using now? The one he told first or the later one? And which is true? When he said I did the deed or when he denied it? There was no one there to defend the truth, since I was the only ally of his later true statement and I happened to be away; others were there, however, who were going to put away his earlier false statements2 ' so that they could never be corrected.
This volume contains the Greek texts of nine famous speeches in which Demosthenes attempted to rouse Athenian alarm about Macedonian ambitions. This volume contains the Greek texts of speeches against Meidias, Androtion, Aristocrates, Timocrates, and Aristogeiton. This volume contains A.
This volume contains N. Isocrates ca. After setting up a school of rhetoric in Chios, he returned to Athens and established a free school of philosophy involving a practical education of the whole mind, character, judgment, and mastery of language. This school had famous pupils from all over the Greek world. Isocrates also wrote essays on political questions, his main idea being a united Greece to conquer the Persian Empire.
Lysias ca. Being a loyal supporter of democracy, Lysias took the side of the democrats at Athens against the 30 Tyrants in , supplying shields and money. After one political speech in accusation of Eratosthenes in , he became a busy professional speechwriter for the law courts. At the Olympic festival of , he denounced, with riotous results, the costly display of the embassy sent by Dionysius I of Syracuse and the domination of Sicily by Dionysius. Publishers: Harvard University Press , G. Be the first to rate this.
Overview The Classical Greek Orators Collection includes speeches and letters from 11 of the most influential orators of the fourth and fifth centuries BC. Place Your Bid Click on the highest price you'd pay. Key Features Speeches and letters from 11 of the greatest classical Greek orators English translations as well as original Greek texts Loeb Classical Library editions. Individual Titles Minor Attic Orators, vol. Minor Attic Orators, vol. This volume contains the Greek texts of the speeches of Antiphon and Andocides.
This volume contains C. This volume contains the Greek texts of the speeches of Aeschines.
Antiphon and Andocides (The Oratory of Classical Greece Series) / Edition 1
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